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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is aimed at highlighting Posner and Hayek’s consensus on the importance of 
decentralization, as well as the significance of the incorporation of non-legal actors as tools for 
facilitating the efficient allocation of resources in common law. In addition to highlighting the 
consensus on the views of Posner and Hayek, in respect of de centralization of information within 
the judicial process, this paper aims to address why de centralization serves as a vital tool in 
facilitating the objective of common law as an efficiency allocation mechanism. Whilst it is argued 
that lower court judges may not and should not be given such flexibility to make and unmake the 
law, the principles and decisions of law lords acting in the capacity of legislature, have also 
illustrated in several leading cases that the flexibility intended by Parliament may be misinterpreted 
and wrongly applied in future cases. This has also resulted in the criticism of extrinsic aids to 
statutory interpretation. This paper analyses and expands on these observations. 
     
Key words: legitimate expectations, certainty, flexibility, judicial precedents, statutory 
interpretation, allocative efficiency, Pepper v Hart, Daubert, common law, regulatory capture, 
regulation   
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Harmonising Hayek and Posner: Revisiting Posner, Hayek & the Economic 
Analysis of Law 
Marianne Ojo1 
 
A  Introduction   
I To Be or Not to Be Regulated: Purposive Rules and the Centralisation of Information  
 
The de-centralisation of the judicial and legislative process has advanced over the years – as 
evidenced by the engagement of legal, non-legal and economic actors in the judicial and rule 
making process. This serves as testimony to the fact that judges may not be fully equipped to 
allocate information in such a way that maximal efficiency or the best outcome is derived for 
involved parties. Other non-legal actors such as financial experts are now being engaged as expert 
witnesses in deciding landmark judgments. 
As well as a tool which serves to facilitate greater checks and accountability in the judicial and 
law making process, de centralization is also accentuating its role as a mechanism whereby the 
efficient allocation of information can be realized. In addition to highlighting the consensus on the 
views of Posner and Hayek, in respect of de centralization of information within the judicial 
process, this paper aims to address why de centralization serves as a vital tool in facilitating the 
objective of common law as an efficiency allocation mechanism.  
 
According to Cooter and Rubinfeld,2 fair and accurate outcomes requires courts to resolve cases 
by applying the law and courts have complete information when full knowledge of the law and all 
the facts that are relevant to the case, are available and are at disposal to deciding matters at hand. 
Further they are of the opinion that complete information at trial results in a judgment that is 
accurate relative to existing law; and that to the extent that liability law is designed to internalize 
costs, accurate results will generate efficient incentives. In the same manner, they further argue, 
                                                          
1 Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North-West University,   Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com 
The author wishes to thank the editor and reviewers for the immensely beneficial comments provided in generating 
this paper 
2 R D. Cooter and D. L. Rubinfeld “An Economic Analysis of Legal Discovery” at page 437 
The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, Economic Analysis of Civil Procedure (Jan., 1994), pp. 435-463 
Published by: The University of Chicago Press for The University of Chicago Law School Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/724329 . 
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that complete information in bargaining before trial promotes settlement on terms approximating 
the complete information judgment. 
The importance of measures aimed at ensuring that the court receives complete information, prior 
to the case or trial – as a means of generating efficient outcomes in the delivery of judgments, is 
hereby emphasized. However current issues revolving around procedures aimed at obtaining 
complete information is also highlighted. Such problems in their opinion, could be mitigated where 
the court is able to ascertain the value of information to the requesting party – hence ensuring that 
such a party fully pays the associated costs of complying with rules.3 
 
The importance of ascertaining the stakes involved for the involved parties is not only vital from 
the perspective of delivering efficient outcomes – which would re inforce the role of common law 
as a tool for promoting the efficient allocation of resources, but also highlight why the 
determination of such stakes constitutes an influential factor in the evolution of common law. 
section II of the Literature Review further corroborates and consolidates on this point. 
The third section then consolidates on the de centralization of information retained by judges in 
the judicial process by way of reference to Posner’s views on Hayek and Kelsen’s concepts of law. 
In arriving at a conclusion that many factors determine and have influenced the evolution of 
common law over the years, the concluding section also highlights why it is necessary to engage 
non legal actors in the judicial process. 
   
II Posner’s conception of law as “a series of disparate rules, and as purposive”4  
The development of judicial precedents and the role of judges in the interpretation of statutes and                
legislation - to better align with the original intent of the legislator, has been evidenced over the 
past centuries. Certain cases, however, have reflected possibilities whereby judicial development 
may generate outcomes which are contrary to legislative intent. This can be illustrated by 
section10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which has been highlighted 
as having been interpreted “to require corporate insiders and tippees to either disclose material 
inside information or refrain from trading.”5 
Carlton and Fischel argue that such judicial development is contrary to legislative intent and that 
no evidence exists to support the fact that Congress intended to prohibit insider trading.6  
                                                          
3 See ibid 
4 TJ Zywicki and ABSanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 93 No                    
2, pp 559-603 February 2008, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, see particularly               
abstract 
5 SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir 1968) (en banc),cert denied,404U.S1005(1971).See D Carlton                        
and D Fischel, “The Regulation of Insider Trading” Stanford Law Review Volume 35 No 5(May 1983)pp 857-895 at                    
page 884 
6 see ibid 
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Further, whereas Hayek is considered to view the common law as a “spontaneous order which               
regulates society better than a person could”7, Posner is considered to view the law as “an order                 
consciously made through the efforts of judges and legislators.”8 
However Posner’s conception of the law as an “an order consciously made through the efforts of 
judges and legislators,” appears to exclude his acknowledgement of the engagement of non-legal 
actors as instruments or means of attaining legal goals. This will be discussed in greater detail 
under section C of this paper. 
 
Such above differing views about levels of control of the law and perceptions of being regulated 
and the ability to regulate, can be regarded as influential factors governing the opinions also shared 
by Posner and Hayek on the roles of judges – one which Posner considers to be more active than 
passive. The question revolving around why firms might want to allocate “property rights in 
valuable information”9 to managers, rather than to shareholders, is not merely based on the 
premises that managers may value such information more than shareholders, but also attributed to 
the ability of such agents to better monitor, supervise and account for the distribution and 
dissipation of such information in a manner and timing (which shareholders are less better 
equipped and specialised to handle).   
From this perspective, it could be argued that whilst information regulates those who are less 
specialized and equipped to handle such information, the delegation and centralization of such 
information to those who are better specialised and equipped to handle such priceless resources 
and privileged public utilities, generates an outcome whereby such information is better regulated, 
as well as maximised.   
In like manner, whilst law, and in particular the common law, could regulate those who are less                 
specialised to handle such rules, they are regulated by more capable individuals and authorities. 
Hence the question does not necessarily and merely relate to whether law is being regulated or 
regulates, but rather, why it should be regulated and the agents through which such regulation 
should take place.   
In their article, Carlton and Fischel, also argue that “even if Federal regulation is justified on the 
basis of law enforcement cost, firms should have the opportunity to opt out of the regulation in the 
                                                          
7 F.A. Hayek (1960). The Constitution of Liberty. Chicago: University of Chicago Press and F.A. Hayek (1973_. Law, 
Legislation and Liberty: Rules and Order, Volume 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.   
8  See R. A. Posner, (2005) "Hayek, Law, and Cognition," 1 New York University Journal of Law and Liberty 147  
 Also see TJ Zywicki and AB Sanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 
93 No 2, pp 559-603 February 2008, George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, see 
particularly abstract 
9 See  D Carlton and D Fischel, “The Regulation of Insider Trading” Stanford Law Review Volume 35 No 5 (May 
1983 at page 866 
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absence of any showing of third party effects, and that such firms are best judges of how to 
structure the terms of their employment contracts.”10 
Therein lies the argument for enforced self-regulation. Whilst individual firms may be the best 
judges to decide on the design of their contracts, in order for those contracts to be tailor made to 
adjust better to their firm’s needs, self-regulation through these firms, maybe better enforced by 
the State and through the courts. Even with its advantages, certain disadvantages can also be 
attributed to self-regulation.11 As well as being consequential of a lack of transparency in a 
regulatory and supervisory regime, regulatory capture is also more likely to occur where a system 
of self-regulation operates. 
 
The aim of the ensuing section is to highlight the importance of the purposive application of rules 
in the “updating” process. Such a goal will be facilitated by way of reference to the rules of 
statutory interpretation.  The section also aims to highlight why the engagement of non-legal actors 
in the judicial process serves as a tool for bolstering claims relating to the efficiency of common 
law as a resource allocation mechanism. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 see ibid at page 895 
11 For further information on the advantages and disadvantages of Self-Regulation, Enforced Self-Regulation see M 
Ojo, “Co-operative and Competitive Enforced Self-Regulation: The Role of Governments, Private Actors and Banks 
in Corporate Responsibility http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27850/1/MPRA_paper_27850.pdf; also see I Ayres and 
J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate Oxford University Press at page 102 
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B  Literature Review: The Evolution of Common Law 
 The Evolution of Common Law: Rules of Statutory Interpretation   
The purposive intent of rules and the legislator constitutes a fundamental characteristic of the 
common law system. In illustrating the increased role of judges, by not only adhering to the 
legislator or legislation, and the growing importance of interpreting rules with intent, the 
application of rules of statutory interpretation and the evolution of such rules will be elaborated 
on:    
 
The Literal Rule of Statutory Interpretation   
This usually constitutes the basic, starting point in construing a piece of legislation. Under this 
rule, judges are required to interpret statutes and legislation according to their ordinary, natural 
and dictionary meaning even if the outcome of such an interpretation may generate absurd or 
ridiculous results. Judges’ roles are considerably limited and restricted under this rule and may be 
regarded as being more passive when compared to their roles under the other methods of statutory 
interpretation. Whilst certainty appears to be an advantage of complying with this rule, such 
advantageous attributes must be weighed against the results which are obtained where absurd 
outcomes are generated and the legitimate expectations of parties involved are effectively not met.     
For this purpose, the golden rule constitutes the next resort where absurd results need to be 
mitigated.     
 
The Golden Rule of Statutory Interpretation   
Under this rule, judges are not only required to give effect to the literal meaning and application 
of the rule, but should also do so with the aim and purpose of avoiding an absurd result. The golden 
rule is namely, thus:   
 
“The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary                 
meaning.”   
- Viscount Simon (Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries)12    
 
 
 
                                                          
12  [1940] A.C 1014 at page 1022 
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The Mischief Rule of Statutory Interpretation   
The mischief rule represents a much narrower application of the golden rule - narrower in the sense 
of its greater focus on the intent of the legislator. Its application is considered necessary where a 
statute is considered to have been introduced as a means of remedying or rectifying a defect or 
problem (the mischief) in the common law.    
 
An extension of the application of the mischief rule is embodied in the fourth and final rule of 
statutory interpretation being considered under this heading: namely, the purposive rule or the Rule 
in Heydon’s Case.    
 
 
The Purposive Rule or The Rule in Heydon’s Case   
The purposive rule or the rule in Heydon’s case, has at its core purpose, the discovery of the intent 
of Parliament or the legislator, namely,   
What purpose was the statute enacted to rectify- for which the common law had a defect or needed 
to be rectified? 
From the above-mentioned rules an evolvement of the role of judges is demonstrated – both in 
respect of a greater role given to judges to interpret according to the intent of the legislator, and 
also in respect of analytic reasoning and balancing.   
It is quite understandable as regards why Hayek and Posner’s backgrounds have considerably             
impacted their perspectives of the role of judges.    
 
As will be illustrated under this section, the de centralization of the judicial process, through the 
participation of economic and non legal actors, as means of achieving judicial goals in the efficient 
allocation of resources, is acknowledged by Posner. Hence to the extent that both Posner and 
Hayek share the view that the decentralization of law respectively facilitates the attainment of goal 
of efficient resource allocation and promotes the rule of law, a consensus for the de centralization 
of rules is shared by Hayek and Posner. 
 
According to Zywicki and Sanders,13 
                                                          
13 TJ Zywicki and AB Sanders, “Posner, Hayek & the Economic Analysis of Law” Iowa Law Review Volume 93 
No 2, page 559 
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“Posner conceives law to be a series of disparate rules and as purposive. He believes that a judge                  
should examine an individual rule and come to a conclusion about whether the rule is the most 
efficient available,” whilst Hayek is considered to “conceive law as a purpose independent set of 
legal rules  bound within a large social order.”    
 
These views will now be examined to a broader context under a landmark ruling which has not 
only contributed to judges’ abilities to introduce aids as a means of interpreting statutes to a more 
effective  extent, but also demonstrates the interdependency of rules - from one social order to the 
next. 
 
Pepper v Hart: The Mischief Rule and the Inclusion of Aids (Parliamentary Privileged              
Information) as a Means to Statutory Interpretation    
Pepper v Hart14 represented a landmark ruling in the sense that it was the first time whereby the 
use of privileged parliamentary debates, information and records (Hansard) were permitted as 
admissible aids to statutory interpretation. The case involved the valuation of employee benefits 
for income tax purposes - given the ambiguous wordings of the statute involved.   The following 
issues were raised in the case:15   
1) Should existing rule prohibiting any reference to Parliamentary material (Hansard) in construing            
legislation be relaxed, and if so, to what extent?   
2) If so, does the case fall within the category of cases where reference to Parliamentary               
proceedings should be permitted?   
3) If reference to Parliamentary proceedings is permissible, what is the true construction of the              
statutory provisions?   
4) If reference to Parliamentary proceedings is not permissible, what is the true construction of the               
statutory provisions?   
As per Lord Browne-Wilkinson:   
“Reference to Parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of 
legislation which is ambiguous or obscure, or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. 
Even in such cases, references in court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where 
such material clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the 
ambiguous or obscure words.”16 
                                                          
14 [1992] 3 WLR 1032, [1993] 1 All ER 42, HL (E) 
15 Pepper (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) v Hart. Decided, 26 November 1992. [1992] UKHL 3 [1993] AC 593 
[1992] 3 WLR 1032 
16  See ibid, also see S C Styles, “The Rule of Parliament: Statutory Interpretation After Pepper v Hart”  Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies Vol 14 No 1 ( Spring 1994) pp 151-158 Oxford University Press 
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Section 63 of the 1976 Finance Act constituted the central piece of legislation in the case. It is 
obvious that in such cases – not just those cases involving contentious attributions to the 
construction of the piece of legislation, but those whose scope may lie beyond the scope and 
principal expertise of the judge, aids to statutory interpretation may be justified where such aids 
are vital to efficient allocation of resources, as well as generating outcomes which could be 
considered to be reasonably efficient within the ambit of legitimate expectations of the parties 
involved.   
Should judicial decisions be criticised for generating more efficient and purposive outcomes              
particularly where the legislative source being referred to (regardless of whether such a source is               
privileged information), has not been altered in any sense, but has simply served as a means of 
shedding more light, providing more information, and giving purpose and meaning (or more 
meaning) to the legislation at hand? 
The decision has been criticized from the perspective that it leads to rigidity in the application of 
of its judgment rather than the flexibility intended under the 1976 Legislation by Parliament. The 
ratio decidendi or principle decided, namely that “that the 'proper' proportion must always be the 
marginal cost”, in Bennion’s view, results in rigidity which could not have been intended by the 
legislators.  
As concluded by Bennion:17 
- Parliament, in adopting the wording of clause (6),  must have contemplated not only that 
the conferred power of judgment would exercised by officials rather than Ministers (and 
on appeal or review the courts), but that it would produce answers that would be different 
in different cases and might, in the light of experience or changing circumstances, be varied 
over time.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 F Bennion, “How they all got it wrong in Pepper v. Hart”(1995), and HANSARD - HELP OR HINDRANCE?   
 A Draftsman's View of Pepper v Hart (1995) http://www.francisbennion.com/topic/peppervhart.htm 
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C Harmonising Hayek and Posner: Decentralisation Through Non Legal Agents 
De centring of rules, as well as information, has been increasingly taking place over the years – as 
evidenced by the engagement of legal, non-legal and economic actors in the rule making process 
and judicial process. This serves as testimony to the fact that judges may not be fully equipped to 
allocate information in such a way that maximal efficiency or the best outcome is derived for 
involved parties. As already highlighted under the introductory section, other non-legal actors such 
as financial experts are now being in engaged as expert witnesses in deciding landmark judgments. 
The use of so called non legal actors to fill in gaps which are aimed at ensuring that judges acquire 
complete information which is fundamental to the efficient allocation of resources, is illustrated 
by the following extract from Posner’s statement:18 
- The point I want to emphasize here is that the content of the legal norms that judges create 
by their decisions is not given by Kelsen’s concept of law. As one of his natural-law critics 
puts it, “How the judge arrives at his decision is [for Kelsen] a ‘meta-legal’ question 
without interest for the jurist.” Kelsen’s rejection of natural law, his emphasis on 
jurisdictional at the expense of substantive norms, his repeated references to judicial 
discretion, his claim that application of law is not mechanical but often involves “the 
creation of a lower norm on the basis of a higher norm,” his acknowledgment that 
sometimes the only preexisting law that a court can apply to decide a case is the law that 
confers the power of decision on the court, and his concept of interpretation as a frame 
rather than an algorithm, delimit a broad range of judicial action that is free (in the sense 
of “free range” chicken)  yet lawful. The judges have to fill it with something, but while 
that something is lawful, it is not the law.” 
 
The role of judges, hence has evolved to the extent whereby the expertise of non-legal actors, as 
well as the incorporation of non-legal medium, through decentralization, whether these constitute 
non-governmental organisations, or financial experts, are required to be engaged in the legislating 
and interpretation of the law, in order for such judicial capacities to attain their maximal potential.  
 
 
The following section is aimed at highlighting Posner and Hayek’s consensus on the importance 
of decentralization, as well as the incorporation of non-legal actors as tools for facilitating the 
                                                          
18 See R.A.Posner, (2001) “Kelsen, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law” at page 20 
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efficient allocation of resources in common law. Decentralisation and the involvement of non legal 
medium also serve to illustrate the evolution of common law from the more centralized role 
previously assumed by judges (now devolved through other non-legal actors) as well as the 
increased role being assumed by litigants through the need to ascertain those who value 
information rights the most. Whilst it is argued that litigants influence the evolution of common 
law,19  the role of judicial opinion in shaping the evolution of the system, is also emphasized.20   
 
The effectiveness of de centralization as an information gathering mechanism, employed in the 
judicial process is illustrated in the following statement by Posner:21 
There are two ways of establishing norms to guide human behavior. In one, which Hayek calls 
“constructivist rationalism,” they are prescribed from the top down by a legislature, a bureaucracy, 
or a judiciary—in other words by experts who gather the information necessary to formulate by 
the method of reason the best possible set of norms. This method, as we might guess from Hayek’s 
aversion to central planning, he rejects as requiring too much information to be feasible; in 
addition, it endangers liberty by enlarging the administrative powers of government and thus 
weakening the rule of law.” 
Posner further adds:22 
The alternative method of creating norms is that of custom, and is based on the superiority of what 
Hayek calls “spontaneous order” over order brought about by plan or design. The word 
“spontaneous,” with its connotation of suddenness, is not the best term for what he has in mind; 
“unplanned” or “undesigned” would be better and “evolved” would be best, given his emphasis 
on the analogy of natural selection. 
The above statements, whilst reflecting support for de centralization, as well as the consensus of 
the evolutionary of the law, is to be contrasted with Posner and Hayek’s view of what roles should 
be assumed by economic actors and judges in the judicial process: 
 
Whilst Posner highlights his support for Hayek’s view that law owes much to custom and that 
custom is a reliable guide to efficient methods of cooperation, he considers Hayek’s idea, “that the 
                                                          
19G L. Priest, "The Common Law Process and the Selection for Efficient Rules," 6 Journal of Legal Studies 65 (1977) 
page 63 and 72. Roubini agrees with Priest’s opinion on judges – his model focusses on decisions of potential and 
actual litigants rather than on judges driving the model. 
  
20 See DG Whitman, “Evolution of Common Law And the Emergence of Compromise Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 
XXIX (June 2000)] at page 781 
 
21See R.A.Posner, (2001) “Kelsen, Hayek, and the Economic Analysis of Law Page 30 
22 See ibid at page 31 
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only thing a judge should do is enforce custom, without any consideration of its consequences, 
because custom is the only legitimate law and so a legal judgment not founded on it is not true 
law”,23 as being too narrow – adding that it “extinguishes any explicit role for economic analysis 
in adjudication.” Posner herein underlines his support for a more active (rather than passive role) 
to be assumed by judges.  
He also distinguishes Hayek and Kelsen by adding that whilst Hayek, excludes the possibilities 
and position that economic analysis might occupy in adjudication, Kelsen, opens that space wide.  
However, it appears that Hayek is also in favor of the engagement of non-legal actors in the judicial 
process. This is reflected where he states that “the ultimate decisions must be left to the people 
who know directly of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet 
them” – as well as his affirmation of the need of decentralization as a means of ensuring that “the 
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place will be promptly used.” 
 
 
D Conclusion   
 
“If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes 
in the particular circumstances of time and place, it would seem to follow that the ultimate 
decisions must be left to the people who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly 
of the relevant changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them.   
We need decentralization because only thus can we ensure that the knowledge of the particular               
circumstances of time and place will be promptly used.”24  
In very interesting fashion, decentralization is also essential towards ensuring that possibilities for             
regulatory capture are minimised.   
Why firms might want to allocate “property rights invaluable information” to managers, rather 
than to shareholders? Because centralisation of information in the ambit of those better equipped 
and specialised to handle such information warrants such a move.   
Centralisation and decentralisation should thus be viewed from relative (as opposed to absolute)             
perspectives. Support for centralization of information is justified where such information resides 
within capable and more equipped ambits who will transform such information for the purposes 
of maximization of wealth or utilities. Given such merits, there still exists the need for checks and 
balance to ensure that such powers are not abused. In like manner, decentralization of information 
                                                          
23 Which he regards as a slight exaggeration of his position, see ibid at page 37 
24  F A Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society” The American Economic Review, Vol. 35, No. 4. (Sep., 1945), 
pp. 519-530 
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/1809376?uid=3739920&uid=2&uid=4&uid=3739256&sid=21104299293711 
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may still be facilitated optimally taking into account timing, manner of the dissipation, and agents 
involved in the distribution of such information.   
Judges should certainly not make and unmake the law in certain cases - the supremacy of 
Parliament should be adhered to. Judge made law, namely common law, however constitutes an 
exception where the principle of stare decisis cannot hold in a world which is constantly changing 
and where those changes need to be incorporated into decisions if such decisions are to generate 
meaningful results.   
Prices, for example, constitute examples of vital information which need to be updated constantly 
if wages which were earned centuries ago, are to have meaningful and reasonable importance and 
values in modern day valuation and measurements. Markets will definitely evolve and adequate 
rules are needed to regulate the markets. This is very evident given the fact that market failures, 
namely information asymmetries exist, and also the fact that the Efficient Markets Hypothesis does 
not hold in its entirety. Decentralization, hence constitutes a means of not only mitigating 
information asymmetries, but also ensuring that efficient maximisation of resource utilisation and 
allocation, takes place.   
Hence the decentralization of powers and information, in this case, from the executive and 
legislature to the judiciary, should be viewed positively as a means of addressing and mitigating 
informational asymmetries resulting from ambiguous, confusing and misleading words within a 
statute and also resulting in more efficient allocation of resources, and awarding of damages to the 
parties involved.                  
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